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There is little question that the interna-
tional spread of antimicrobial resistance
(AMR) is an alarming development that
the global public health community must
confront as a matter of some priority.
Reducing the incidence of new cases will
take the concerted effort and participation
of all community sectors, and will require
strong political leadership. The World
Health Organization (WHO) is best
placed to lead the international commu-
nity’s efforts to tackle this phenomenon,
and as evidenced by the release of a new
fact sheet on 21 February 2011 [1], the
WHO Secretariat is acutely aware of the
dangers microbial resistance presents.
In the paper ‘‘A Call for Action: The
Application of the International Health
Regulations to the Global Threat of
Antimicrobial Resistance’’ published this
week in PLoS Medicine [2], Stephen Har-
barth and colleagues make the case to
utilize the revised International Health
Regulations (2005) (IHR 2005) to encour-
age Member States to report all cases of
AMR as they fulfil ‘‘at least two’’ of the
criteria for a public health emergency of
international concern (PHEIC). While I
commend the authors for seeking to
further the field of understanding relating
to the interpretation, application, and
implementation of the IHR, I disagree
with their proposal. For reasons of brevity,
I will outline just three reasons here.
The Object and Purpose of the
IHR
Firstly, the fact that no international
agreement to address AMR currently exists
is insufficient justification for co-opting the
IHR. This is principally because the IHR
were never intended as a blanket frame-
work to tackle all disease threats. When
they were first created in 1951, the purpose
of the IHR was described as ‘‘to ensure the
maximumsecurity against the international
spread of diseases with a minimum inter-
ference with world traffic’’ [3]. Despite the
multiple disease threats in the 1950s, only
six were considered serious enough to
warrant a new international agreement.
Importantly, this was not only because of
the clearability ofthese six diseases tocause
widespread human suffering, but also their
ability to disrupt international trade. In the
2005 revisions, the scope of the IHR was
expanded by adopting a broader definition
of ‘‘disease’’ [4], but their essential function
remained unchanged—they are a frame-
work to guide inter-state behaviour when
confronted with an acute public health
emergency that threatens to disrupt inter-
national trade and travel.
To emphasise this dual focus, the
revised IHR introduced the concept of a
PHEIC. As defined in Article 1, a PHEIC
is an ‘‘extraordinary event’’ that consti-
tutes a public health risk, which may also
require a coordinated international re-
sponse. While outbreaks of carbapenem-
resistant Enterobacteriaceae (CRE) are a
worrying development that may warrant
reporting under the IHR (and provision is
already made for this within Annex 2), it is
hard to appreciate that the global spread
of AMR counts as ‘‘extraordinary’’ given
that resistance has been a regular phe-
nomenon since the invention of antibiotics
in the 1940s and multidrug AMR has been
anticipated for at least the past three
decades. Moreover, the definition of
‘‘public health risk’’ emphasises ‘‘a serious
and direct danger’’ [4]. A sense of
immediacy can be appropriately inferred
from this qualification—immediacy fur-
ther corroborated by the inclusion of the
term ‘‘emergency’’ within PHEIC—sup-
porting the commonly held view that the
IHR are designed to deal with acute (as
opposed to chronic) public health condi-
tions that are readily transmissible and
disruptive to international trade.
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Linked Policy Forum
This Perspective discusses the fol-
lowing new Policy Forum published
in PLoS Medicine:
Wernli D, Haustein T, Conly J, Carmeli
Y, Kickbusch I, et al. (2011) A Call for
Action: The Application of the Inter-
national Health Regulations to the
Global Threat of Antimicrobial Resis-
tance. PLoS Med 8(4): e1001022.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001022
http://www.plosmedicine.org/article/
info:doi/10.1371/journal.pmed.1001022
Stephen Harbarth and colleagues
argue that the International Health
Regulations (IHR) should be applied
to the global health threat of
antimicrobial resistance.
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A second reason is pragmatism. Put
simply, the amount of information gener-
ated by mandatory reporting of every
AMR case (irrespective of whether they
constitute a PHEIC or not) would likely
overwhelm not only Member States, but
also the WHO Secretariat. It should be
recalled, for instance, that the syndromic
reporting trial that was initially trialled in
the late 1990s to determine the suitability
of syndromic reporting systems for the
revised IHR framework had to be aban-
doned prematurely, largely because of the
overwhelming number of reports it gener-
ated [5]. The WHO Secretariat simply did
not have the resources to deal with the
amount of information the trial produced.
Given that the WHO is already facing
significant budgetary constraints heading
into the next financial period [6], available
resources have to be a consideration in
assessing the Harbarth proposal, as does
the technical capacity of Member States
and their willingness to report cases of
AMR under the IHR. Indeed, it is critical
at this juncture when many low-income
countries are already struggling to
strengthen and maintain disease surveil-
lance capacities to meet their obligations
under the IHR, not to overburden them
further by requiring National IHR Focal
Points to report each and every disease
cluster. Unless a specific outbreak of AMR
cases poses an imminent risk to global
public health and fulfils the criteria
outlined in Annex 2 of the revised IHR,
other mechanisms can and should be used
to report such occurrences. Broadening
the scope beyond this is both inappropri-
ate and impractical.
The IHR Are Only a Framework
In their paper, Harbath and colleagues
claim that the IHR ‘‘provides a global
surveillance infrastructure and orches-
trates an appropriate public health re-
sponse’’ [2]. This assertion, though, com-
pletely misrepresents the nature and
reality of the Regulations. The IHR do
not provide surveillance infrastructure—as
identified above, they are merely a set of
guidelines that rely on goodwill to steer
inter-state behaviour. In fact, the IHR
draw on several existing surveillance
networks to accomplish their objective.
There is no separate infrastructure. There
are few IHR-dedicated staff. Even within
Member States, those tasked with respon-
sibility for liaising with the WHO via
National IHR Focal Points usually have
multiple responsibilities. It is in this regard
that invoking the IHR as a way to compel
Member States to report cases of AMR
will not resolve the ‘‘patchy’’ surveillance,
nor address the ‘‘financial and technical
constraints in large parts of the world’’ [2].
Improved surveillance is needed, but this
will require political leadership and can be
accomplished more appropriately through
other mechanisms, such as the Global
Outbreak Alert and Response Network.
The IHR are not the appropriate mech-
anism to accomplish this work.
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